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“The mutual constitution of culture and
mind is a topic of central importance
across all of areas of psychology.” With this
mission statement, Frontiers in Cultural
Psychology declares mutual constitution—
the process by which mind and culture
“live together, require each other, and
dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make
each other up” (Shweder, 1990; p.1)—as
the unifying theme of its otherwise diverse
contributions. Implicit in this theme is
a non-essentialist understanding of both
culture and mind. One direction of this
dynamic process refers to the cultural
constitution of mind. Mind is not sim-
ply an expression of genetic blueprint;
instead, it emerges through active partic-
ipation in and ongoing engagement with
sociocultural affordances present in the
structure of everyday worlds1. The other
direction of this dynamic process refers
to the psychological constitution of cul-
tural worlds. Cultural worlds and their
particular affordances do not exist apart
from human activity; instead, they per-
sist (or not) because people in the ongo-
ing flow of everyday life actively select
and (re)produce features—and de-select
1Our references to affordances emphasize the points
of contact between a non-reifying cultural psychology
and various articulations of “ecological” psychology
(Barker, 1968; Gibson, 1979; see Oishi and Graham,
2010). Besides providing tools for a more dynamic
approach to themutual constitution theme, ecological
orientations to cultural psychology also make contact
with sociocultural-historical versions of the Cultural
Psychology project (e.g., Cole, 1996).
others—that resonate with their particular
beliefs and desires. Among other exam-
ples, this dynamic conception of culture
and mind is evident in work that considers
the mutual constitution of moral under-
standings and sleeping practices (Shweder
et al., 1995); motivational orientations and
constructions of success and failure sit-
uations (Kitayama et al., 1997); affective
orientations and children’s books (Tsai
et al., 2007); personal identity and soci-
etal master narratives (Hammack, 2011);
or national identity and constructions of
history (Carretero, 2011).
Despite this non-essentialist vision,
much of the work that carries the label
of cultural psychology continues to reflect
and reproduce problematic reifications
of culture and self (see Hermans and
Kempen, 1998; Adams and Markus, 2004;
Gjerde, 2004; Hammack, 2011). One could
identify many examples to illustrate this
point. The particular case that provoked
the present commentary is an article by
Mojaverian et al. (2013).
The strength of the article lies in the
productive use of comparison across cul-
tural settings to illuminate the cultural-
ecological foundations of professional
help-seeking. Conventional scientific wis-
dom portrays as standard (and prescribes
as optimal) models of professional help
that emphasize explicit socio-emotional
support and patient disclosure as part of
the treatment process. The comparison
across settings suggests that these mod-
els do not operate as some context-general
law; instead, they reflect context-specific
dynamics of self and relationship that are
prevalent within the European American
settings that disproportionately inform
scientific imagination. The same models
may be ineffective or counterproductive
(e.g., by inflicting additional stress) when
imposed without reflection upon other
settings. By illuminating the cultural-
ecological foundations that underlie stan-
dard models of professional help, this
comparison across cultural settings directs
attention to the historical processes that
produce “normal” standards, helps to de-
naturalize conventional scientific wisdom
(see Adams et al., 2012), and contributes
to the anti-essentialist vision of cultural
psychology implicit in the mutual consti-
tution framework.
Problems of reification arise—in both
the article and the field as a whole—
in associations of culture with essential-
ist categorical distinctions. Researchers
rarely provide context-sensitive accounts
of cultural-ecological patterns or affor-
dances, and instead rely on broad national
or racial/ethnic categories as problem-
atic shorthand for cultural engagement
or participation. There could be defen-
sible reasons for the authors’ citation
of patterns observed among “Asians,”
“Asian Americans,” “Chinese Americans,”
“East Asians” as the basis for hypothe-
ses about (or interpreting results of)
Japanese participants. However, the re-
deployment of these categories with-
out a discussion of particular cultural-
ecological patterns—and the correspond-
ing implication that US-born, English-
speaking students of Asian descent have
more in common with Japanese students
than with their “Caucasian” American
colleagues—appears to locate the source
of commonality in some shared, racial
group essence.
Similar issues are evident in concep-
tions of cultural competence (see Kirmayer,
2012 for a review on, critiques of, and
conceptual alternatives to cultural com-
petence), which the article associates with
“creation of ethnic-specific mental health
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services [that] focus on incorporating
cultural values . . . and encouraging cul-
tural understanding between mental
health practitioners and their clients”
(p.7). Too often, such “cultural under-
standing” amounts to little more than
racialized stereotypes of otherness that
reproduce and homogenize across dubi-
ous categories (see Mudimbe, 1988, on
“invention of Africa” or Lewis and Wigen,
1997 on the “myth of continents”). These
practices do damage not only because
they exaggerate and falsely fix boundaries
between people in ways that are artificial
and absolute (see Lutz and Abu-Lughod,
1990; Kirmayer, 2012), but also because
they reflect and reproduce long-standing
systems of racist and imperialist oppres-
sion (e.g., see Shaw, 2005; Kirmayer, 2011;
see also Said, 1978, on Orientialism).
Regrettably, such entity-based concep-
tions of culture and unconsidered use
of problematic categories have become
standard practice, even within otherwise
critical perspectives of cultural psychol-
ogy. Despite aspirations to challenge
generalizations about humanity, these
practices promote the un-reflexive (and
often unwitting) reproduction of stereo-
typical generalizations about “cultural
differences” and “cultural others.” Despite
aspirations to illuminate the dynamic flu-
idity of human psychological experience,
these practices portray the cultural consti-
tution of self (an emerging process) as the
production of different varieties of self (as
a more-or-less finished product). In other
words, these practices promote not only
reification of culture, but also reification
of self.
As an antidote to problematic reifi-
cations of culture and self, the mutual
constitution framework emphasizes the
ongoing, dynamic production of cul-
ture and mind. From this perspective,
cultural participation is less about con-
scious indoctrination into bounded sys-
tems of timeless traditional values than
it is engagement with particular cultural-
ecological patterns: that is, the structures
of everyday worlds—including institu-
tions, practices, artifacts, and discursive
tools—that scaffold psychological expe-
rience Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952).
At the same time, cultural worlds are
not static, timeless entities, but reflect
and require culturally grounded actors
who continually reproduce them with
the psychological charge of their particu-
lar desires and beliefs. Rather than con-
fine people in invented traditions (e.g.,
Hobsbawm andRanger, 1983) of imagined
racial communities (e.g., Anderson, 1983),
this articulation provides a more produc-
tive conception of culture adequate for
Frontiers in Cultural Psychology. This con-
ception promotes “cultural understand-
ing” not by rehearsing problematic eth-
nic stereotypes, but instead by revealing
the broader historical processes at work
in the production of “normal” scientific
standards.
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